un<1 rct(')riCl rclatlv<1l1lentc moderada ticnc SllS falccs ell [a historia del p'11S. En Finlandl<1, p,1fa mllchos cilldadanos la intl'n'l'llCi(ll1 dd Est<Hlo ha sido positi\'a. ActtlJ[mellte, cl F<;tado es competitiv{) pero suhsistl'll prohlemas a nive! de! Fstado de biencstar, que ha perdido impulso en cspccial dcsdc 1a crisis ccon6miL',l de los anos llo\'cnta.
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INTRODUCTION
In recent years Finland has become an attractive proposition in global terms. Economic success, lack of corruption, achievements in education, and even the pioneering digitalisation of the TV-network, have focuseJ un this country in the br North. In the earl)' I 99lls the countr), bced its worst economic depression since the 1930s, bur hy the second half of the decade had already had several prosperous years, with a 5(~{) annual increase in GNP. Finland is sometimes considered an appropriate 'model' to be followed, as only 50 years ago this wealthy nation was still ranked among poor coulltries ICastells and Himanen, 2002) .
The purpose of this article is to study the hackgrollnd of this relatively rapid economic success, and determine \\rheth-er there are any particular reasons for it. \10reo,,('r, the u)]lcept of nc()-liberalislll is put lInder focus, i.e. to what extent can present day finland be considered to be based onneo·liberal thought? !\Iy point is that overall neo-liberalism is not particularly popular in Finland, but it seems that political decision-making could illcreasingly be placed in this category. i\ly reading focllses particularly on naming and rhetoric labeled as neo·liberalist, by opponents J.nd supporters. In this sense, m)' approach resembles conceptual history, and thus concepts are contested, as they do not have solid meanings but can change and absorb Ile\V ones when used in variolls political and historical contexts IKoselleck, 1979) . !'vly thesis is that neo·liber.1Iist polio cies were introduced, not in the rypic1.l political form, hut instead under the umhrella and rhetoric of maintaining and saving the welfare state. This type of relatively moderate rhetoric has its origins in Finnish history. I argue that one decisive factor in Finland's success has hcell its peculiar politicll culture, which has stressed consensus and avoided high politicol profiles and politization. Thus, how WaS it possible to implement probably the largest cuts in public spending in the \X/estern world in norl11<l1 circlll11stances (julkunen 20U 1,253) without causing major political clashes? Hence, at a third level, the focus of the paper moves on to questions of (or lack of) resistance and political dehate.
A.-lcthodologically, my 3pproach adopts a historical angle, as all existing 'models' have a historical origin. The point is not to study the past as sllch, hut to show how it has made an impact on the present and advance the relevant arguments. To describe views of politics in the 1990s and early 20005 I use Reinhart Koselleck's concepts of space of experience and hUI iLun of expectations. According to this author, the past can he present this very moment, and at the same time affect future expectations: «experience is present past, whose experiences have heen incorporated and can be remembered». Expectations are a p~Ht of the present, too: «personal specific and interpcrsol13.1 expectations also take place today: it is the future made present~ it directs itself to the not-yet, to the non-experienced, to that which is to he revealed" (Koselleck, 1985: 271-272) .
CAPITALIST, SOCIALIST, THIRD
WAY?
According to every day language, a 'model' is an examrde or a style that is imitated or attempted to be copied. In the Finnish case, we have to he morc specific, that is, wc must define precisely which 'model' is at sf;_1ke, as over the years several political processes ha\'e been laheled under this umbrella. At first Finland was presented as a 'model' in the sense that it is a country that only over the past fift), years has chauged from an agrarian society to a postindustrial hi-tech network society.
Secondly, during the Cold W,u, Finland could have been classified as a 'model' of peaceful co-existence. In Europe, Finland's geopolitical position was extraordinary: at the time it was the only capitalist country on the Soviet horder, politically sovereign and independent, but bound to the Soviet Union through a military agreement.
In WWII, Finland was on the losing side, but since then it has successfully turned necessity into a virtue, paid \var reparations and at the same time managed to develop its own industries. According to this classification, Finland was a capitalist mixed market economy, although not liberal in the Hayekian sense. According to a famous Finnish metaphor, political leadership plaved the part uf a doctor in world politics and instead of acting as a judge avoided prov()king great powers, particularly its powerful socialist neigh hour and main trading partner.
NevC'rtheless, when analyzing a 'model', in the case of Finland it is even more important to foclls on its western neigh hour, Sweden. In the 1950s Finnish Prime ;vlinister Urho Kekkonen saw S\vcden as a potential path toward ... reaching the horizon of expectations. According to this, Sweden and Finland could he seen as representing neutral third-\vay countries, between capitalism and socialism. During Urho Kekkonen's presidency Finland WdS finally a more socially-democratised society that integrated its critical leftist forces.
In fact, during the Cold War, finland and its 'tlnlandisation' hecame a Illodd' for some Llst Europeall countries. for example, in the midst of the democratic transition, the ChainnJ.n of the Hungarian Parliament wondered whether there was more socialism in Hungary or in Sweden, Finland or Austria. For a Finn, the question was to some extent astonishing although from the standpoint of the glohalmarket it did make some sense: Finns did not live in a command economy hut in a kind of centrally planned economy that has close ties with the banking sector. Whenever necessary, the state intervened in the economy and helped the export industry \vith huge devaluations of the markka, the Finnish currency. Liheralis~ltion of the monetary sector was launched step by step in the mid-19g0s. One signal came again from Sweden, \vhere social democrats had revised their third-way policy in 1982 and now stood hetween a traditional social democracy and neo-liheralism (Patomiiki, 2007: 52) .
Thirdly, social and labour market policies could be characterized as a ·model'. After WWlI the idea of a welfare state in which the state plays a crucial role started to prevail through the implement'<Hion of a distrihutive income policy. Elements of the ScandinJvian universal welfare state were comhined with a more conservative (West) C;erman 'model'. In the field of labour, from the end of the 19605 the government and labour organizations entered into large collective agreements. This almost corpof<1tive 'model' did not put an end to strikes but taught politicJI 'realism' ,1I1J l11<lintaineJ communication between different interest groups. Until recentl)" the collective income policy has covered most employees, and memhership in trade unions has been ver), high, aroLlnd. gO';;, (Siltala, 2007: 563) .
Thus, I contend that during the Cold War Finland was a sllccess story. By 1975 private consumption had doubled compared to 11)52. In 11)84, political terminology even included the concept of a Northern Japan, as Finland's economy grew as bst as the Japanese. l\ow"day5, Nokia, the flagship of «finnish» industry, is ass()(iated with mobile phones but J gener"Jtiol1 ago the company's main image was as a supplier of rubher shoes, and as sllch is still in the memory of the older geneL_ltiolls.
DOWN AND UP
In addition to the Cold War, one cannot avoid a reference to the role of the economic depression in exploring recent changes in the 'model' and Finland's success. Raija .IL1lknnen (201l1, [63] [64] '''gues that the depression finally made pussible a polic)' that had earlier heen promoted hy the economic elite hut had never heen implemented. One of the symptoms of the new horizon of expectations could he found in the translation into finnish of friedrich A. Hayek's Road to Serfdom, published as late as 1995. In the afterword of the translation. Jyrki Livonen argued that three myths, the state, the puhlic sector and "Iuhsidised agriculture, prevented real attempts at solving Finland's current prohlems. According to his horizon of expectations it was no longer possihle to solve the crisis hy traditional mealls and pointed to Hayek's ideas, who already in the 1940's had criticised the puhlic sector and powerful corporations (Hayek, 1995: 251-253; Suomen Kuvalehti 13/1993) .
Thus, in Finland the recession updated nco-liberalist discourse. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, 150 000 jobs were lost. This is, however, not the whole story as the crisis was also due to un fortunate domestic politic31 decisions made at the turn of the decade (Suomcn Kuvalehti 46/2001). Liberalisatioll of financial markets was completed during a boolll, in 1989. At first, to hold the economic boom, the markka was revaluated, hut as the tide hegan to turn this started to ieed speculatiolls of devaluation. ~evertheless, in the midst of the worsening economic conditions, the currency was linked to the ECU, without devaluation. Five months bter, in No"ember 1991, the Bank oi Finland and the government were forced to devaluate and in 1992 let the currency flo<1t. The l1nemployment rate rose to I W~~I and gross national prodl1ct fell 14(Yo. The public sector rose to 54,};) of the GNP, that is, close to the critical dividing line of 60'Yo between capitalism and real existing socialism, as defined by Roy Jenkins in the 1970s, when Britain had to follow IMF orders. In additioll to llnemp loyment the pu b lie sector was hurdened by the crisis in the hanking sector, further worsened hy devaluation and loss of value of property. The government made a political intervention, sllch as that introduced in the LIS in 2008, and rescued the banks '. The amount provided is equivalent to olle and a half years of income tax and more than war reparations paid to the Soviet Union after \X1WII -one of the corc narratives in Finnish postwar history. However, according to Finnish scholars, this W);, of the G/'o.iP is still less than the amount spent in b<lllks in many other countries, sHch as Argentina (55,3%), Chile (41.2');,), Mexico (I3,S%) or Hungary (10,0%), in the 1980s and 1990s (Kiander & Yartia, 1998: 143 Finland (julkunen, 2001: 73-74 ). Sweden spent 6()lo of the GNP on bank operations, practiced more orthodox Keynesian policy, ,lnd kept unemployment at a much lower level. Four timl's in succession, the budget deficit \vas larger than the worst deficit registered in Finland. Nevertheless, those \vho criticize Swedish policy, remind us that Sweden is an example that shows that in a global framework it is no longer possihle to maintain the welfare state as such (ibid. 275). Since then the deh<lte has focused on whether correctly timed Keynesian actions could also have decreased the impact in Finland (Kiander & Vartia, 1995) . In general, it was considered in Finland that Sv .. 'edish policies were too risky and radical. Traditiunally, finnish governments have favoured balanced budgets and avoided deht. Historically, for example in the USA, Fiuland is considered a country th,lt meets its debt payments. Aw.ueness of the existence of debt made it possible for the state, i.e. for uxpayers, to assume the hurden of the hanking sector's private deht.
This 'model' for dealing with the crisis has another, more party political c1l'ment. In 1991, a more ideological emphasis returned to Finnish public life, as after being defeated in the elections the left decided to stay out of government. In Finland, governments have traditionally not been formed on the basis of an ideological left-right axis, llsually composed of social democrats and the centre. Since 1991, the centre-right government has challenged tmde unions hy 4 I ahandoning the collective income policy, and thus trying to change the old rules of the gamC'. In the left-\ving horizun of expectJ.tiulls there \\'LTe serious feJ.rs of a «rolling bacb) through decreasing wJ.ges, cutting several Stl hsidies and the dole, thus burdening employees but, to cuntrast thl' debate, at the same time found resources to purchase 60 US military destroyers. MOrC(lVer, there \vas talk of financing dole through personal accounts, and Chile was mentioned as a potential 'model' for the reform of the pension system i.lulkunen, 2001: 211,221).
In spite of many diffiotities, the government completed its term, which lasted until the elections in 1995. And in spite of cuts in public spending and the tightened atmosphere, trade unions did not resort to methods such as general strikes, and even hent to ~lllo\\' the weakening of some working conditions. Exports started to grow in 1994 and four years later Finnish purchasing power was already greener th(-1I1 that of Sweden -for the first time in history. HOlVever, the first budget with a surplus only callle about in 2000, the first time in ten years that state income reached 1990 levels. In 1995 1 social democrats won the elections and ohtained the Premiership, although there was no leftist majority in Parliament. Paradoxically, according to the Finnish system, negotiations between parties decide which parties will co-operate in the government. The forming of the broad based «rainbow co,-llition" \vas quite a surprise. The largest right-\ving party, the National Coalition Party, split from its former p<lrrner, the Centre Party, ;.llld formed a coalition with the winner. Formally, co-operation was based un answers to questions concerning forthcoming hudget cuts, as all parties \vere eager for power and for taking part in government. The other winner, the LeftWing Alliance, was the most divided, as after budget cuts were made puhlic, olle-third of the group opted for not participating in government (Helsingin Sanol11at, 13 April 1995) . In ~eneral, the Left ;.lgreed that there were no more ideological ohstacles for cooperating, while the douhts of the rightist wing were silenced with arguments regarding the seriousness of the current crisis (ihid.,5 April).
The birth of the Loalitioll was h;.lscd on wide hudget cuts. As the opposition lIsually has less power, it was relatively easy to integrate critical voices into the government, as has heen done several times before in Finnish history. Although it was necessary to ,-Hiopt immedi,-lte unpleasant measures, such as reducing allowances for children, they ,Iso hroadened the whole palette. Until then, governments had ahvays promised to improve services, this time the coalition made sure it \vas done. The political foclis was changed from puhlic spending to increasing public productivity and employment \vas considered the hest social policy. i\1oreover, the IlLlllagement of state companies \vas modified and in some cases they were partdly privatized. Paavo Lipponen has recently been in favour of a moderate priv<1tis<1tion and the stock markets, claiming that they produce resources for meeting debt payments instead of resorting to the budget (Lipponen, 2008: 56) . In the early 21" century, Finland's debt is far from alarming -42-44% of GNPcompared to European levels (Helsingin Sanomat, 15 September, 2004) .
The most crucial decision was making Finland one of the first countries to adhere to the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and introducing the Euro at the same time as older Eli members (2002) . Finns joined the EU in 1995, v./ith 57(};, supporting memhership in the relevant referendum. Keeping in line with this doser integration became a question of authority and discipline for the government, as the former governing party, the Centre Part)' opposed it. From the point of view of the 'model', the EMU became at the same time the stick and the carrot, as it introduced stahle rates for the currency and destroyed the old dt'Y<llu,uion option. ()n the horizon of expcct;ltiol1s the carrot lTcated h{)pe~ of reaching something ilew, «European"~ however, as ,1 stick it fed continuing demand.., for cuts in puhlic spcnding. E\ll1lTitcria are a hudget deficit of ,)i~(), whilst in the early I 991ls, at its largest, it re<l(jled H-12 'X, .
As to taxation policies Finland has heeIl ranked in the EUfopeJ.Il group, that h;'ls taxed high income earners heavily. Howevcr, in the case of middle leyel incolllc carners, it equals the average Europciln le\'el of 3 I, 3 ij~ and has heen decreasing it cOlltinuously since the mid-199IJs. Almost all traditionally c.lpitalist m.uket economics in Europe have .1 progressive income tax, and Finland is no exception. However, the European taxation m,lp is in constant turmoil Jnd is a challcnge for Finland as well: in the old market cconomies, only kebnd, Guernscy ;.mdJerscy have an equal fi1X, a trend that is present in all former soci,llist East European COlllltries except Hungary, where rejecting.l progressivc income tax is under dchate IJ\epszabadS<lg, 9 I\h)', 20IlS).
At the intern;.uioll • .ll level, Finland and S\\'eden still ha\'e moderate differences ill income, hut the g.lp has \videlled. In Finland, in Il)l) I the wagc difference hetween all average worker and J. manager was 14 times, but in 200 I it h,\(.1 increased to 30 times. These arc smallilumhers comp,ued to the US (over 500 times) and Britain (around 1000 times), hut they arc also ,1 political (l11cstion, i.e. how wide a gap is politically acceptahle. At present, for Finnish citizen ... sociJ.I ineljl1Jlity is one of the most important politiL'al problems. On the one h.lIld, therc is a g,lp hl'fweell those who have a good work f{.'(.:ord and those who haven't, and on the other, betwccn the traditiOl1;llly richer southern part and the rest of the country.
The end of the rCI.:l'<.;sioll W,lS ,1 turning point, and in this sense we ,lre back at 19~ I-I '1S7 lewis (l'atom; iki,2007: IIl7 (TLIononen, 20(5) . In thc prl'<;cllt school <;Y'item, Sl'p'H,ltioll into other schools ukes place relatively late, (lilly at the ,1ge ()f 16, compared to the older and mort..' undemocratic system. where it took pL.Ke when students were ,Hound 11-12 years old.
In ,lliditioll to education, one of the leading dogmas in hnland is intcrnation;ll competitivcne'i'i. The way it has dealt with recession has been <lcknowl-edged internotionaliy and the country's competitiveness glohally has scveral times heen ranked best hy the World Economic Forum (d. Nyyssiinen, 2007, 3 I) . According to present poillts of view it is considered that depression is a Schulllpeterian creative destruction to construct something already ncw. Finland did not need l!\lF policy guidance -although even this was expected during critical ye,lrs. Even here we can qucsti( H1 the criteria ()f competiti veness, hut the direction seellls cle;.1f.
Along with the other Scandinavian Pf<)tcst;lllt cOl1lltrit..'s and with C(Hlntries such as New ZeaLl11d. Singapore, Switzerland and the I\;etherlands, Finland is olle of the least corrupt countries in the world. Finns ha\'c ,\Iso tried to promote their openness and transparency in the European Unioll. Finlls are strict, and no doubt one nt..'eds not P,lY hrihes to get through hure'Hlcracy. However, the point is more complicated than it woulJ at first seem, as in the English-spc,lking world corruption refers also to gcneral rotting and rottellllCSS. \Xrhen expressed s<lrcasrically: if Ollt.' corrupts ;111 thc time one does not have to pay hribes when in immediate trouhle. Finnish political culture recognises unofficial hehaviour and contacts lIsually kno\vn as «good brother» networks, \vhich operate between influential citizens, and sometimes the line is dra\vn regarding public relations and sponsoring. The topic recently came to the fore after a donation case in an election campaign. In spite of formal legality, the Glse hecame 1110rally prohlematic when it was puhlicl)' revealed that the Prime !\..linister promised to Ln.'our his d()J1()r's, a husinessman, construction application. Politicians should puhlish donors' names but due to the lack of formal sanctions they usually remain unknown. as their starting point: the gap (Finland 3.6) is almost three times higher in the US (9.0) and Singapore (9.6), and also less when compared to the ,lVerage in advanced economies (5.H). They also listed many challenges that Finland has to face, sLlch as how to renew the old industrial sector, not only the IT, or to create symholic meanings for products, ne\v lifestyles 1 as Nokia did, to restructure govCfnance to networks, how to find ncw enterprises, critical husiness, hacker ethics or problems and vulnerahility in globalisation, etc. (Castells and Himanen, 2002) .
Both considered that the Finnish identity is oriented to\vards the future and not towards the P,lst and suggested that a net\vork society could even offer Finns a new identity. Emphasis on the horizon of expectations instead of on experience is understandable in the sense that as a «yOllllg) nation Finland has relatively few national traditions Jnd therefore has only a few historical points of reference, which has made it easier to adopt internati011<ll perspectives I]\;y),ssiinen, 2008: 224). For example, in Parliament a particular future committce, the newest of tile permanent cOlllmittees, was estahlished in 199,1. Every fourth year it prepares a reply to the govcrnmenfs strategy paper, and thus concentmtes on long-term political topics. The committee h~lS dealt with questions of technology, cnergy, innovation, genetics, population Jlld in general has discussed potenti:ll futures for Finland and thc world in general.
I\.loreover, during the years 1994-1995 the concept of an information society ,lppeared in documents of the I\.linistries of Treasury and Education Since then, three nationwide strategies have heen outlined, showing Finland is coping in the global economy. Over thL' last few years the foclls has moved from networks and technology towards information as a part of everyd<lY lift', dynamic competitive services and culture. However, in many kinds of projects dealing with public resources the concept itself has become a general rhetorical slogan. According to critics, the prohlem is that 1\1Ps take the present glohal order, in which neolibcralislll persists without major crises, too much for granted, and the <lim is securing Finland's international competitiveIless within this framework (Patolllc.lki, 2007: ISS).
III addition, several years ago the state launched its own productivity programme. In principle, it continues to sustain the idea of 'Iightening' the hurden of the state and the administration: in 1997, the number of provinces was reduced to five and a municipal reform is on the way. According to the new productivity programme, in 2005-2011 the staff of all governance sectors should be reduced hy %00, and another 4800 in 2012-2015. The project deals with all sectors working for the government, and tries to make the ~tate hureaucracy more attractive and efficient through rationalising and llsing modern technology. One departure point refers to helping the public sector cope with challenges relating to the ageing of the population, which particularly in Finbnd is increasing rapidly, and iu this regMd will be the top ranked country of the EU in less than ten years.
Jt is argued that rising costs, i.e. deht and taxes, are limited alternatives, due to the goal of m,lintailling intern3tional com petitiveness (AI i valtiosihteeri).
Finland and the Finnish state have no douht been trained to <l great extent according to the dogma of international competitiveness. ]n Sv,,'eden and Finland, active labour force as ;] part of population has traditionally heen highest and at present also tops the EU average. The EU aspires to attain a 70 l XI hy 20 10, whilst Finland has defined a goal of 75%" so that in the future three out of four people should be in the labour force (Nyyssiinen, 2007: 34-35) .
There is 110 clear definition regarding productivity, but it seems quite clear th<lt in the future more and 1110re should he ohtained by fnver and fewer -and older people. The price is high, as present practices resemhle Kosclleck's irollY of Krllschev's horizon of communism: when the horizon is attained it has already disappeared. For trade unions the nature of the project is contradictory as there is a threat of concentrating only on reducing personnel instead of in flnding real solutions for increasing productivity. In the long run, this stretching out of both the system and personnel is of course unsustainable and there ::Ire already signs of this both at the physical and mental levels. In Tayiorisl11, the dividing line between the wurld ui necessity Jnd the world of freedom was clearer, whilst now employers expect a combination of entrepreneur's innovations and increased time control. This situ<1tion is also new in Finnish universities, where there are now I (}~) more teachers thall in 1985, bur also 70');) more graduates (Siitala, 2007: 368) .
In spite of growing prosperity there is ~ln impression of a persistent recession and lack of pl1 hlic resources. Strikes are rare: irom I 991·20l14 as many days were spent on strikes as in 1986 alone (Siltala 2007, 583) . In the network society life and work seem to he a tlexihle and productive proiet'[ or policy, since value is measured only in the market. Nuwadays holidays are no longer simply a holiday, as during that time arol1nd 40(1;) of Finns keep their mobiles switched on or read their husiness e-m~lils. According to historian Juha Siltala, we are moving from the golden era of the 1970s and I 980s to an iron era. Work as sllch has changed, but in cOl1ntries like Finland or the United States only around 10';(, could actually work independently in the information society, \vhere policy is distinct or extinct. In other words, these new technologies have not set us free. Referring to present policies Siltala ironically asks: What is a deaconess' responsibility for ensuring a profit for her bosses? (ibid., 111,240-246,368 'lector lack a permanent contract.
In the network society nothing SCems to he enough. In October 2004 the Centre for Finnish and Business Policy Studies puhlished a report where it is argued that real change has only just begun. The 21 It century will he totally different from the 1990s, and therefore taxation, income policy, education, the puhlic sector, etc., 11<1ve to change (Nyyss()nen, 20()7: 44). The same line of thought was continued in the comments on the Nordic 'model' (lOll?). Banker and commentator of the study, Bjc)rn \XTahlroos, contends that scholars hang on to a 'model' th~1t hardly exists anymore, whilst actually what looms in the horizon is an AngloSaxon 'model'. The report recommends increasing productivity, p.Hticularly in the pU!-'dic sector, and assumes that hecallSc their needs have been relatively Illet Finns Jo not recognise the need for a chan~e (Kauppalehti, 14 Decemher, 201l7) . In the spring of 2008 represent,Hives of Finnish employers expressed that the ITa of the collective IIlcomc policy is over and that in the rresent glohai framework it is it too rigid. On the basis of mutual discussions, trade unions are looking for nc\v hroader moJes beyond the trade union level. However, the future is uncertain.
Low PROF! LE FINNISH STYLE
The country is now richer than ever, more open and efficient, but also more unequal and cruel than in the 19XIls (Heiskala, 2006) . According to Raija Julkunen, in Finland the biggest cuts in public spending implemented in Western Europe, or even the whole Western world, were carried out in normal times (2001: 253). How was this possihle without major unrest, riots or new populist movements?
In Finland, the state has represented something good for many citizens. Hegelian tradition has heen strong and due to this experience it was relatively easy to add international competitiveness to this continuum, as a new form of a struggle for existence. Also, a long time agu a compromise -oriented politicking gained the upper hand. The impression is that the opponent will be l11et after the following elections and that the winner-takes-all policy leads only to political countermeasures. h is perhap~ no eX<.lggeration to say that Finnish elites arc at one with e.1(h other, and that they will discuss matters <.ll1long thl'lllselves. Part of this style is frequently descrihed ,1'; a process in which clites at first agrec Oil a topic and then advertise it J.S the only alternative for thc people. This, lIsually cllled ,1 « rhetoric of necessity". is pr<.Ktica I hm abo politiC11I)' problematic because it limits political dehate and alternatives to technical solutiOlh and issues orders from aho\'e. Fur example, during the recession, the Finnish \Iinistcr of the Treasury used as a slogan «Siberia will teach you" (the same politician continlIcd to hold ofnce in thl' 1995 coalition with the tt)rmer opp()siti(Hl). The sl()ga n carried a stick and ~l carrot in the same sentence: unless YOll ohey and do what we tell you to do, consequences will be worse. The argument is based on Lltional conservatism wherehy the prcsent and the already knowil alternative are the hest optioll <.lnd proh.lhly ,]Iso the only olle required. Indeed, when answering public opinion polls, many seemed to prefer cuts in puhlic spcnding instc<.H.i to deht.
Ilowt'ver, SOille Illay haVl' h.1d ill mind another well-known slog~l1l: ill rhe 1940s President .I.K. !'aasiki,·i .ugued that wisdom hl'gins with acknowledging facts. I\atuLllly, we call disagree <.md ask wlut those 'facts' fil1~llly ,He, hut according to the Paasikivian realist school, the slogan opposed aIlY idealistic cru~,lde <.lgainst the SO\'id Union. The idea was suhsequently evaluated by his successor Urho KekkoIlell, for whom Finns' «n<1ti(lllal l'h.1L1cter» favours moderate solutions. Of course, ordin~HY citizens could not possihly be ;'Kquainted with ,111 the complicated details of the 19~()s reces,>jon, hm to J certain extent they were aware th<.n a crisis existed. I thillk all this might somchow expbin an ultinutc ch.mge of the peaceful 'Illodel' ill FinlaIld.
For some, the prescnt Finland is one of the most US-t),pe countries ill the old Europe, whilst others consider that its policy reflects Finlli~h pLlgm,Hislll or limited lleo-liher<1lislll. According to i\1alluel Castells alld Pekka Himanell (20(}21. Finlalld sa\'ed the" health\' core" of the w{'lfare statc. Ilo\\"CH'r, their view might oilly be <1 preliminary victory before the final defeat ill a continuous competition of glohal capitalism. For Ill'o-liher,llists, the Finnish sy~tel11 retains too Illllch s(lcialdem()cratic ethos. It seems the country has not ch,lIlgcd as much .1S some have requested tlnd others h,1\'e fetlrC'd.
As a p~lrt of this process, for the Llst twenty YC.HS the Finnish st;:lte h'1s hccn tmined tls it it werc an Olympic athlete. In Illtlny Sl'nscs Finns have managed to pull ahead hut the bct that current references are Britain and Italy L1ise douhts rl').J;;Hding the l'ontent of the concept welfare state. at least as a model for differellt coulltrie". On the hasis of recent evcnts it seems that the statc is in good shape. But wJut about the peoplc? Finland is wealthier th.l1l c\'er, hut even in an economic hoolTI an o\'erall fee\-ing of uncertainty has becume part of the present culture of governance ,1nL! p()\\'er. International competitiveness is the neWl'st civil religion. but its price has to hl' discussed properly. 
